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- For GPs, dominant disease models (biomedical or 
psychosocial) often do not fit with reality 
- Both patients and doctors struggle with and suffer from this 
incongruence 
- In the lack of congruent disease models, a validating doctor-































To gain a deeper understanding of challenges faced by GPs when 
managing patients with MUS.   
 
Methods 
We used meta-ethnography to synthesize qualitative studies on GPs’ 
perception and management of MUS. 
 
Results 
The problem with MUS for GPs is the epistemological incongruence 
between dominant disease models and the reality of meeting 
patients suffering from persistent illness. GPs have used flexible 
approaches to manage the situation, yet patients and doctors have 
had parallel negative experiences of being stuck, untrustworthy and 
helpless. In the face of cognitive incongruence, GPs have strived to 
achieve relational congruence with their patients. This has led to 
parallel positive experiences of mutual trust and validation. With 
more experience, some GPs seem to overcome the incongruences, 
and later studies point towards a reframing of the MUS problem.  
Conclusion 
For GPs, the challenge with MUS is most importantly at an 
epistemological level. Hence, a full reframing of the problem of MUS 
for GPs (and for patients) implies broad changes in basic medical 





Short-term: Improve management of patients with MUS by 
transferring experience-based, reality-adjusted knowledge from 
senior GPs to juniors. Long-term: Work towards new models of 











General practitioners or family physicians (GPs) daily meet patients 
with symptom presentations that are not attributable to a specific 
diagnosis. Several of these will be categorized as suffering from 
medically unexplained symptoms (MUS). These represent conditions 
ranging from mild self-limiting symptoms to severe, disabling 
disorders [1, 2] and account for 10-15% of all GP consultations [3, 4]. 
When trying to classify these patients and offer them treatment and 
support, GPs face several management challenges. 
Assessing, diagnosing and treating these patients is difficult, 
especially in terms of defining ‘medical’ and ‘unexplained’.  GPs tend 
to embrace and attend to the complexity of patients presenting with 
diffuse complaints, and to resist the classification of MUS [5]; this 
may be because the diagnostic category of MUS does not cater for 
the inherent complexity and uncertainty in medical practice [6]. 
Hence, the clinical usefulness of the diagnostic category MUS in 
primary care is questionable (ibid). In general, both clinicians and 
researchers agree that the term MUS is unsatisfactory as it implies a 
not yet found explanation and maintains a mind-body dichotomy.  
The biopsychosocial model [6, 7] is often emphasized as useful for 
the management of MUS.  When using the three dimensions 
involved for a holistic assessment, the model is suggested to be a 
key to patient-centeredness [8, 9].  One aspect of patient-
centeredness [9] is the therapeutic alliance.  According to many 
studies on management and perceptions of MUS, the doctor-patient 
relationship is often a source of frustration due to differing illness 
perceptions [3].  
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Several qualitative studies have attempted to explore the above-
mentioned challenges, i.e.  doctors’ and patients’ illness and disease 
concepts, management strategies, and how to maintain a well-
functioning doctor-patient relationship. However, despite the 
development of certain educational tools [11, 12], GPs still face 
severe challenges in the management of patients with MUS. 
Qualitative studies of the management of MUS have mainly 
provided self-contained and descriptive results, confined to the 
context of the immediate sampling. Our aim is to contribute to a 
deeper understanding of the problems that GPs encounter when 
meeting patients with persistent medically unexplained symptoms, 
and to look for possible ways to solve these problems.  To achieve 
this, we will present a specific type of synthesis, a meta-
ethnography, of qualitative studies on GPs’ perception and 




Meta-ethnography is one of several methods for synthesizing 
qualitative research (Dixon-Woods et al. 2005). It was developed by 
Noblit and Hare [13], adopted by Britten et al. [14] and has since 
been increasingly performed, also in the field of MUS [15]. In meta-
ethnography, the idea is to translate studies into one another, 
rather than to aggregate findings, and to develop a new 
interpretation through comparison and conceptual innovation [13]. 
Such interpretations may result in different kinds of syntheses: a 
reciprocal translation, a line-of-argument translation or a 
refutational translation, depending on the studies and their 
potential for cross-translation. We chose this method of synthesis 
for its interpretive approach and international recognition. The 
research team consisted of a medical anthropologist with long 
experience in the research field (MBR) and an academic GP skilled in 
qualitative research (MLJ).  
To identify published work, we independently searched the 
databases PubMed, Web of Science, Scopus, PsychINFO, EMBASE, 
SweMed and Cinahl for the period of 1995-2014. The search words 
were: 1. Physician; 2. Attitude OR perception OR experience OR 
management OR understand OR deal OR strategy OR perspective OR 
belief; 3. Somatoform disorder OR psychophysiological disorder OR 
somatization OR functional disorder OR MUS OR MUPS; 4. 
Qualitative. We also hand-searched key journals, key authors and 
explored reference lists in relevant papers. These searches rendered 
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around 130 articles altogether. We then screened abstracts and, 
when needed, whole papers, looking for the following criteria: 1. 
Papers should be original and based on empirical material; 2. Papers 
should use qualitative methods; 3. Papers should include an aim of 
exploring management of MUS in mainly primary care, seen from 
the doctors’ perspective. We discussed all papers with relevant 
titles, until agreement. We excluded papers concerning only one 
syndrome disorder, like IBD or CFS, and papers that primarily 
evaluated an intervention. Finally, we included 13 articles. Following 
the advice of Noblit & Hare [13] and Campbell et al. [16], we did not 
screen the papers further for methodological quality. The rationale 
behind this was that descriptive papers with poor conceptual 
development will in any case contribute less to the outcomes of the 
final synthesis.  
Details of each paper included are found in Table 1. Seven papers 
were based on focus groups with physicians, four were based on 
individual interviews, one used group and individual interviews and 
one was a secondary analysis of many individual interviews from 
prior studies. The two authors went independently through each 
paper several times in order to identify key concepts and the 
authors’ interpretations of them. This was a long process where we 
met repeatedly to discuss our ideas. We then started to look for 
similar or recurring concepts across papers. We compared the 
concepts in one article with concepts in others, separately 
developing tables in numerous versions to juxtapose our candidate 
concepts. We discussed whether they represented a similar idea, 
and thus could be translated into each other, and which sub-
concepts and nuances they seemed to consist of. During the 
comprehensive process of this ‘reciprocal translation’ [13], third 
order concepts were developed. Numerous tables and notes 
documented this process. We considered whether the concepts 
pertaining to the original papers (second order concepts) were the 
most accurate to cover our reciprocal translations (third order 
concepts). Some concepts were kept in the original form, some 
changed in wording and some were reinvented for better 
explanatory power, see Table 2. Finally, we found it possible to 
construct a line of argument to define how the third order concepts 
related to each other. Thus, departing from Noblit & Hare, we first 
performed a synthesis that aimed at a reciprocal translation. We 
then developed a line-of-argument synthesis, accounting for 
relations, e.g. time and context, between the third order concepts.  
The line-of-argument synthesis goes further than a description of 
the papers included, and represents a new understanding based on 





The third order concepts developed during reciprocal translation 
appear in the upper row of Table 2. We will now present these 
concepts while illuminating how the key concepts from the original 
papers (see the left column of Table 2) underwent reciprocal 
translation.  
 
3.1. Epistemological incongruence 
Almost all papers mention the incongruence between patients’ 
symptom presentations and the explanatory models for biomedical 
disease, but in different versions.  Asbring & Narvanen [18] point to 
a discrepancy between the ideal, learnt during medical training, of 
diagnosable and curable diseases with biological causes and 
objective findings, and the reality encountered in practice of people 
suffering from illness and social distress, who present with 
subjective symptoms and need of care.   
In encountering patients with CFS and fibromyalgia, the 
physician is unable to provide the patients with a causal 
explanation; the condition is difficult to treat and it can be 
hard to answer all the patients' questions. There thus may 
emerge a discrepancy between the ideal and reality.  
With longer professional experience, however, the physician role 
may be transformed from an idealistic role to being experience-
based and reality-adjusted. Hence, the epistemological discrepancy 
could be solved through practiced experience. Woivalin et al. [19], 
Stone [28] and Ivetic et al. [26] also note that with experience, 
doctors tolerate more insecurity, leave the ideal of curing and move 
towards “reality”.  
According to May et al. [20], the problem with MUS is that doctors 
and patients possess incongruent theoretical models of the disease 
process. Whereas patients (according to the doctors) mainly have 
biomedical models of organic pathology, doctors employ a 
psychosocial model, which patients (according to the doctors) resist.  
One way to see this [incongruence] is as a reflection of 
doctors’ perceived failure to persuade patients to work 
within the same medical model; patients regard their 
problems as organic in origin, while doctors tended to see 
them as having social or psychological causes.  
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Hence, the basic problem with MUS, according to May et al., is the 
epistemological incongruence between the concepts of disease for 
doctors and patients, and how to communicate these:  
The congruence between medical and patients’ models is 
not, here, a matter of the invidious distinction often made 
between professional knowledge and lay health beliefs […], 
but rather about whether, in general terms, they are 
formulating the patient’s symptom presentation using a 
similar conceptual vocabulary. 
In Woivalin et al. [19], GPs also see MUS as originating in distress 
and psychosocial problems, not “a medical matter”, while patients 
(according to the doctors) see their problem as biomedical. 
However, the two perspectives need to be integrated. Wileman et 
al. [17] write that according to the doctors, the patients’ distress is 
rooted in the social, while patients show resistance to such 
explanations. In Mik-Meyer & Obling [23], the doctors use a social 
diagnosis to legitimize the sick role of their patients. Olde Hartman 
et al. [22] reflect on the paradox of explaining the unexplained, 
while being embedded in opposing models of explanation where 
GPs hold the ‘social’ position and patients the ‘medical’ one, and the 
authors emphasize the importance of establishing “common 
grounds” (congruence):  
..searching for a symptom explanation together with the 
patient is an important task of GPs in daily practice as it 
gives them the opportunity to establish common grounds on 
which they can jointly understand and manage the patient’s 
needs. 
Stone [29] models a destructive consultation process where doctors 
and patients “were unable to develop a shared framework” and go 
into negative looping [30] or a “duet of escalating antagonisms” 
[31]. For comparison, Stone [29] also models a consultation process 
with positive looping. The essential difference is that the GPs in the 
positive looping are able to have “their own professional culture 
which accepts medically unexplained symptoms as real and 
important experiences”. Hence, there is epistemological congruence 
between doctor and patient in the constructive consultations, 
paving the way to possible shared solutions. 
During our analysis of all the papers, we found a chronological move 
in the findings from what seemed to be a vast epistemological 
incongruence in the early papers towards more integrated models in 
the later papers. Paralleling a more integrated view, which was 
either due to other research interests or to real developments in 
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general practice, there seemed to be fewer reports of negative 




3.2. Power relations 
Power is a concept that is explicitly addressed in the first five papers 
(2002-2006). Complementary aspects of power are presented, 
concerning the doctor-patient relationship, the authority of medical 
knowledge and the position of GPs within health care systems. 
In Wileman et al. [17], the interviewees experienced that the 
balance of power was with the patients, making the GPs 
uncomfortable and frustrated, feeling powerless. The problem of 
power thus concerned the relationship with the patients and the 
nature of the complaint: 
Social problems were named frequently in the etiology of a 
patient’s symptoms which, however, the GP had little power 
to influence.  
Patients were described as ‘frustrating’ or ‘heartsink’. 
Exploration of such feelings revealed a spectrum of emotions 
from inadequacy to resentment and fear of such patients 
who could dominate and manipulate the course of the 
consultation  
Asbring & Narvanen [18] also emphasize the interviewed physicians’ 
experience of helplessness, frustration and failure, but more in 
terms of their professional identity being threatened when they 
were unable to help their patients. The experience of a negative 
power balance was related to the limits of their medical capacity. 
Woivalin et al. [19] address experiences such as feelings of 
insecurity, cynicism, and powerlessness. Dilemmas around the 
etiology of symptoms were present when assessing the patients, but 
the experience of frustration and powerlessness was more 
connected to clinical pragmatics. Ringsberg & Krantz’ [21] analysis 
concentrates primarily on strategies for coping with MUS patients. 
Power is discussed in terms of the GPs’ roles and responsibilities e.g. 
having the authority to issue certificates.  
May et al. [20] specifically address legitimacy, power and authority, 
especially concerning GPs’ (lack of) power to solve the problems of 
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patients presenting with MUS. The GPs were challenged in their 
effort to legitimize the patients’ symptoms, to be competent 
managers of patients and to handle the emotions connected to 
meeting the patient in the clinical encounter. The inherent power 
balance could create frustration and experience of failure, ‘not being 
able to solve the patient’s problem, nor escape the responsibility for 
doing so’.  It is argued by May et al. that by working towards 
congruence at several levels, doctors may experience patients as 
less problematic, may maintain their medical authority, and may 
contain expressions of symptoms rather than trying to relieve them. 
These strategies could ensure a better distributed power balance.  
The remaining papers also bring up similar challenges and problems 
experienced by the GPs, concerning incongruent explanatory 
models and the challenge of managing the relationship with the 
patient, but they do not conceptualize these in terms of power 
relations, but rather in terms of authority. In Czachowski et al. [24], 
the Polish GPs portray themselves as having a negative image as 
professionals with the patients. Hence, they experience that, in the 
patients’ eyes, they have less authority than their specialist 
colleagues do. Kuruvilla & Jacob [25] are concerned about how 
knowledge structures, formations and practices from tertiary care 
have gained universal authority, and advocates that primary care 
should be understood and conceptualized on its own terms.  
 
3.3. Flexible approaches  
The notion of flexible approaches to management is introduced by 
Woivalin et al. [19]. Being flexible represents the authors’ ideal of 
“good quality patient work”: to integrate biomedicine with 
humanistic perspectives. Flexible approaches are a palette of clinic-
near strategies for managing patients with MUS: disciplinary 
approaches, clinical communication tools and coping strategies; 
these are pragmatic ways that, according to experience, may suit a 
GP and take the patients’ social background and life into account. 
While some of the approaches stem from a specific discipline and 
others are practical types of management, they enact specific ways 
of explaining and understanding MUS. In other words, the 
perception of the disorder determines how the doctor approaches 
MUS.  
Asbring & Narvanen [18] note several strategies that GPs apply to 
manage patients with MUS: adjusting the ideal to reality, doing 
something concrete, keeping a distance or getting closer, trying to 
find causes other than biomedical ones, giving the patient 
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responsibility and trying to get the patient to accept the situation. 
Woivalin et al. [19] classify GPs’ management strategies in terms of 
a biomedical, a psychological, an educational and a psychosocial 
approach. These approaches differed according to the patient and 
the situation, and several approaches could be used with one 
patient and within one consultation. Hansen et al. [27] found that, 
when presented with new symptoms, the GP starts by searching for 
a disease (biomedical approach). With returning complaints, GPs will 
start going by the routine (pragmatic approach). If the GP is open to 
various explanations from the start, the approach could be following 
various paths, considering also psychological and social explanations 
for [20] the symptoms, and educating the patient. The key concept 
in Hansen et al. is alternating approaches, which we believe 
represent the same idea as flexible approaches:  
GP’s choice of approach for patients with MUS varied from 
consultation to consultation, and the patient usually had 
gone through a series of consultations that focused on the 
physical aspects of the problem before the GP addressed the 
possibility of the symptoms being medically unexplained.  
 
3.4 Parallel experiences 
…not only do patients with MUS need to be conceptualised as 
legitimate in their complaint but also the GPs are in need of 
legitimate patients in the encounter to be judged as credible or 
infallible professionals (Mik-Meyer & Obling) 
Negative experiences and emotions are reported in several papers 
and cover both patient and doctor experiences, as seen from the 
GP’s perspective. Our inspiration for this analytical concept derives 
from Stone (2014) who reflects upon this finding and conceptualizes 
it as ‘parallel experiences’. The GPs tell about experiences of being 
stuck [17, 19] in an insolvable, inescapable situation [20], and 
sharing feelings with patients of inadequacy, embarrassment, 
frustration and helplessness [17-20, 24, 29]. Patients risk their 
legitimacy, and doctors risk their professional credibility [18, 23]. 
The experience of personal distress and mutual frustration may 
cause relational difficulties and compromise clinical professionalism 
[17-21]. Feelings of shared helplessness [28](Stone) and unhealthy 
dependence or mutual dependency [26, 28] may occur.  
The parallel negative experiences are related to the epistemological 
incongruence of disease models that MUS reflects. Both parties 
suffer from the incompatibility of symptom understanding, 




3.5. Relational congruence  
Cognitively, GPs experienced incongruence between attempts at 
being flexible and the reality and disease models presented by their 
patients with MUS. Emotionally, the GPs tended to seek congruence 
through the establishment of good relations, alliances and 
partnerships: 
These patients were therefore seen to be difficult to manage 
and frustrating for the GP, but the importance of the 
relationship was emphasized frequently and actively sought 
by the GPs  
Notably, Wileman et al. [17] emphasized already in their early paper 
the importance of a relationship of trust, partnership and support. 
Showing empathy could lead to a mutual alliance but was also a way 
of gaining the patient’s trust in the doctor’s explanations [17].  
Similarly, in olde Hartman et al. [22], the doctor-patient relationship 
is actively used to gain relational or emotional congruence between 
patient and doctor, especially when congruence of explanatory 
models is not possible: 
The goal of this collaboration is to maintain the doctor-
patient relationship by providing emotional support through 
some kind of ritual care. 
Olde Hartman et al. [22] value ritual care and a mutual alliance 
between patient and doctor, while May et al. describe maintenance 
of the doctor-patient relationship as a risk of collusion with the 
patients and their symptoms. Ivetic et al. [26] state that believing 
the patient, trusting the patient and taking the symptoms seriously 
is essential. This fits well with research showing that patients with 
MUS are more in need of emotional support than somatic 
examinations [32, 33]. It also fits well with a general practice 
philosophy of building continuous relationships with patients [34]. 
Ideally, doctor and patient are “partners with a common problem” 
[26]. In Stone’s work [28], the GPs express a strong ethical obligation 
to accept responsibility to care for a suffering patient. Connecting, 
building relationships and being committed are even seen as 
therapeutic, contributing to rebuild the patient’s sense of self [28].  
 
 
3.6. Reframing understanding and management of MUS  
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According to several papers, the epistemological incongruence 
explained above calls for a reframing of the clinical situation. In 
Asbring & Narvanen [18], the GPs learn to balance ‘ideal versus real’ 
where the ideal is biomedicine as a learnt discipline and the real is 
experience-based knowledge. In Mik-Meyer & Obling [23], the GPs 
have shifted from biomedical explanations to establishing a social 
diagnosis in order to legitimize suffering and illness. Several papers 
describe the different paths that GPs may follow when their 
biomedical approach seems insufficient. These attempts of 
reframing knowledge systems also expand to gaining ‘relational 
congruence’. Especially olde Hartman et al. [22] show the link 
between firstly, an attempt to gain explanatory congruence by 
“changing the agenda” and secondly, if this does not work, an 
attempt to deal with the doctor-patient relationship and to establish 
different kinds of cognitive and emotional alliances. In this process, 
both doctors and patients may reframe their explanatory models. In 
general, we see that early papers point out the need to establish 
psychosocial models as an option, while later papers seem to build 
on this as an already integrated model for GPs.  
Wileman et al. [17] use reframing to refer to explanations of 
symptoms, Woivalin et al. [19] talk about an educational approach 
and olde Hartman et al. [22] about changing the agenda – all three 
directed towards making the patient reframe rather than the GP. 
Several advocate for ‘experience’ as decisive for a GP’s reframing, 
and several implicitly advocate a psychosocial model to be used as 
reframing. Stone [28, 29] expands this with a theoretical 
understanding inspired by anthropology and sociology. She suggests 
a conceptual move from curing to caring and coping, which might 
help the patient as well as the doctor. ‘Shifting gear’ is a shift not so 
much from biomedicine to psychology, but more from ideal medical 
knowledge to a pragmatic approach, based on a shift in thought 
style:  
Shifting the emphasis from cure to coping without a disease 
name is challenging for both the doctor and the patient. 
However, the doctors in this study found caring for patients 
with medically unexplained symptoms a rewarding area of 
clinical practice […] In adjusting to chronic illness, they 
provided non-judgmental support for their illness combined 
with safe scanning for disease over time [28]. 
Reframing as used by Stone means a change in both the patient’s 
and the doctor’s agenda, and a change involving both explanations 
and relations at a cognitive and emotional level. This kind of 
reframing signifies new clinical strategies and implications for 
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general practice in terms of management, regarding both the 
relationship and the disorder.   
 
 
3.7. Line of argument: synthesizing our third order concepts   
The problem with MUS for GPs is the epistemological incongruence 
between learnt ideal disease models, and the reality of meeting 
patients suffering from persistent illness and distress. This 
incongruence has influenced the power relations between doctor 
and patient, and threatened the authority of GPs on an 
epistemological, relational and pragmatic level. GPs have used 
flexible approaches to manage the situation, but despite this, 
patients and doctors have had parallel negative experiences of being 
stuck, untrustworthy and helpless. In the face of cognitive 
incongruence, GPs have strived to achieve relational congruence 
with their patients. This may lead to parallel positive experiences of 
mutual alliance, trust and validation. With more experience, some 
GPs seem to overcome the incongruences, and later studies point 
towards a reframing of the MUS problem.  
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
4.1. Discussion 
In the translation between studies, we found that GPs struggled 
with incongruences at a professional knowledge level, at an illness 
conceptual level and at a relational level. They struggled with their 
learnt biomedical concepts of disease (in some cases with added 
psychosocial approaches) and the opposition of those to the 
personal illness and symptom experiences and explanatory models 
of patients, both claiming authority and trying to gain legitimacy. 
GPs also struggled with incongruence in relationships with the 
patients. When conceptual incongruence was rigid, this could 
jeopardize the doctor-patient relationship. GPs tended to wish to 
repair relationships and make alliances, which often seemed to be a 
foundation for overcoming other incongruences. Studies show that 
people with undiagnosed illnesses struggle hard to be believed, 
understood and taken seriously [35]. They want their doctors to 
acknowledge that their symptoms are real [36]. To be left as a 
“medical orphan”, and “left to get on with it”, marginalized from 
medicine, is experienced as intolerable [36, 37]. Precisely when no 
medical explanation can be found, and deep uncertainty is faced, 
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the therapeutic relationship becomes a lifeline for the patient [38]. 
As patients and doctors seem to have parallel experiences of being 
stuck, unbelieved and helpless in the face of diagnostic uncertainty, 
relational congruence might be a lifeline also for the doctor.  
 
Culturally, we are entrenched in a body-mind dualism [39]. This 
dualism entails a dominance of the biomedical disease model, which 
is a barrier to diagnosing people suffering from persistent 
unexplained symptoms [40]). However, “in general practice, 
biomedical reductionism is ultimately impossible”[20] p. 12. Our 
synthesis shows a development since this influential paper (ibid), 
where some GPs seem to be moving towards recognizing patients’ 
symptoms as real and worthy of relief. This indicates a move 
towards epistemological congruence, which is noteworthy. Insights 
from prior reviews, like Burton et al. [41], might have contributed to 
this move.   
 
To overcome incongruences, explanation is crucial to patient 
management [10, 42, 43]. In their overview of explanatory models 
for MUS, van Raavenzwaaij et al. [43] found nine different models 
drawing on different research fields. The authors conclude that 
combining knowledge of such models with practice experiences and 
understanding of the patient’s beliefs may facilitate patient 
reassurance and satisfaction. An earlier study by Salmon et al. 
argues that patients with somatization disorders feel satisfied and 
empowered by medical explanations that are tangible, exculpating, 
and involving [44]. Other studies emphasize that it is important to 
elicit the patients’ models of illness before giving medical 
explanations, and try to develop explanations in a dialogue with the 
patients [10, 45]. To summarize, explanatory models are crucial to 
solving epistemological incongruences. However, asserting only 
professional models and not considering the patient’s models or 
illness representations may instead maintain incongruence.  
 
We found that flexible approaches and reframing, i.e. deliberate 
attempts to establish new strategies for GPs, could potentially be 
shared explanatory models. Several of our included studies refer to 
the strategies used by GPs as divided into either a bio or a psycho or 
a social approach - or a combination. Notably then, what we found 
in terms of epistemological incongruence was not a dichotomy 
between ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ models [46], but rather the reverse: 
Many GPs held a ‘psychosocial’ position and referred to patients as 
holding a ‘medical’ one. A psychosocial or biopsychosocial model 
seemed to work as a frame of reference in daily work for nearly all 
GPs. This, as we have shown, did not per se solve problems of 
incongruence and communication with the patient. The patients 
presented as holding medical disease models were presumably in 
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cases where consultations were stuck. Not every patient clings to a 
medical explanation. The explanations patients present in clinical 
consultations are adjusted to the situation, shaped and evoked by 
what is legitimate in a specific ‘regime of value’. How symptoms 
may be phrased in terms of clinical idioms and how they are 
negotiated are a result of a specific discourse and social space [47, 
48].  
 
The development of a psychosocial/biopsychosocial approach 
employed by GPs during the period of this research is noteworthy. 
However, discussions on the biopsychosocial model (BPS) and its 
usefulness are ongoing. Butler et al. [49] argue that the model is 
wanting, especially in the case of MUS, as it rests on a philosophical 
approach based on the duality of mind and body. This duality is the 
deepest sense of the concept of incongruence. The BPS model 
seems to suggest a correction of patients’ notions of pain and 
suffering, to make them realize that they have misinterpreted the 
level of location of their symptoms (ibid). This is parallel to 
longstanding empirical attempts of reattributing patients’ physical 
symptoms to psychological causes [50].  Butler et al. [49] suggest a 
more ‘interpretivist’ approach to support clinicians to help their 
patients ‘make sense’ of their symptoms, as what they are to them: 
‘a component of a person’s interpretation or reaction to their 
situation in the world’. The embodied self experiences suffering and 
pain as a unity, not as something that can be divided into a 
hierarchy of system levels [49]. In other words, BPS may in some 
ways be ‘reframing’ MUS, but its applicability is disputed.  
 
Taking forward reframing as the concept in our analysis that 
points to a more radical way of moving beyond earlier GP strategies, 
we may then ask what kind of change is needed and what new 
frames may work. Stone [28] suggests including anthropological and 
sociological theories that explain and conceptualize the patients’ 
situations and views. This interdisciplinary shift leads her to propose 
several management strategies related to caring and coping more 
than cure: agreeing that the patient is suffering and taking the 
responsibility for patient care, tolerating uncertainty and validating 
both patient and doctor. This implies a patient-centered, 
therapeutic partnership, acknowledging ‘parallel experiences’: 
neither doctor nor patient are alone with this. Stone further calls for 
experienced supervisors to share their experiences with younger 
colleagues [29].  
 
Our study has its strengths as well as limitations in the choice of 
meta-ethnography that encourages an interpretive approach to 
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reviewing. Interpretations differ in richness but we believe ours are 
based on thorough work of analysis with key concepts, and our pre-
knowledge of the field. Sharing a GP’s and an experienced 
researcher’s point of view was an asset in the interpretive process. 
The studies included display different conditions of working as a GP 
and different contexts of health systems. We did not take much 
account of this, since it was not thoroughly addressed and discussed 
in each paper. We however believe that including contextual 
dimensions in an analysis would increase the level of understanding 






GPs’ management strategies of patients with MUS are challenged by 
incongruences at several levels, most importantly at an 
epistemological level. Our meta-ethnography shows that GPs 
attempt to expand their consultation approaches and knowledge 
base to meet these challenges but also that such approaches still 
contain limitations, such as struggling with explanatory models and 
a (bio)psychosocial approach that often lacks patient-centeredness  
and does not transform into shared epistemology. However, our 
analysis advances the field by showing how shared parallel 
experiences in the consultation and attempts at reframing point to a 
new understanding of these doctor-patient relationships. This 
implies a need to recognize that the disease models dominating 
medical education and clinical reasoning are deficient.  
 
 
4.3. Practice implications 
 
A short-cut strategy to improve consultations and management of 
patients with MUS would be to transfer knowledge and skills from 
reflexive and experienced GPs to students and junior doctors. The 
transfer should focus on how to build a relation and a consultation 
that transcends the GP’s standpoint and works towards social and 
emotional support as a core for a reframing: from curing to caring. 
An interdisciplinary understanding that is formative for one’s 
approach matters more than instrumental toolboxes. The long-term 
strategy implies developing disease models that are more congruent 
with an interdisciplinary understanding of etiologies and 
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Figure 1: Search flow in Web of Science, PubMed, Scopus, 
PsychINFO, EMBASE, SweMed, Cinahl, hand search and papers 

















Table 1: Features of the 13 papers synthesized 
Source Year  Country Sample  Data collection Analytical approach 






Asbring & Narvanen 
 [18] 






Grounded Theory  
Woivalin et al. [19] 2004 Sweden 27 primary care 
physicians   
Focus groups Phenomenography 





Constant comparative re-analysis, aiming 
at formal theory building 
Ringsberg et al. [21] 2006 Sweden 27 primary care 
physicians   
Focus groups Phenomenography, coping theories 
Olde Hartman et al. 
[22] 
2009 Netherlands 22 GPs Focus groups Constant comparative, thematic coding  
Mik-Meyer & Obling 
[23] 
2012 Denmark 21 GPs Individual and 
group 
interviews 
Theoretical: concepts from Goffman, 
Parsons and others 
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Czachowski et al. 
[24] 
2012 Poland 14 GPs Focus groups Thematic 
Kuruvilla & Jacob 
[25] 
2012 India 23 physicians 
(primary care, 
psychiatry) 
Focus groups Framework approach with constant 
comparison  
Ivetic et al. [26] 2013 Slovenia 24 Family 
Physicians 
Focus groups Content analysis 
Hansen et al. [27] 2013 Denmark 28 GPs Focus groups Grounded Theory 





Constant comparison, concepts from 
Charmaz and others 
















Reciprocal translation of concepts across 13 papers 
The left column contains key concepts from each paper. The top row contains our translated concepts, and the columns below show how each paper 
contributed.  





















for patient  
 







Not credible Mutual 
acceptance 
Transforming 













































Explaining the  
unexplained 
 












Social diagnosis Social diagnosis 
 















Social distress Disempowerment     
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Ivetic [26] Mutual 
dependency 














Hansen [27] Alternating 
approaches 
  Alternating 
approaches 































role nor clinical 
role 
Mutual 
validation 
 
Shared 
understanding 
 
